Although some philosophers, such as Daniel Dennett, have disputed the validity of this distinction,[36] others have broadly accepted it. Byrne, A. The basic idea and metaphor is that we should think of the entire cognitive system as built on a “blackboard architecture” which is a kind of global workspace. "[27] The experience itself is not blue; rather, one “sees right through” one’s experience to its representational properties, and there is nothing else to one’s experience over and above such properties. [153] There are also some scientists who have expressed grave reservations about the idea that the brain forms representations of the outside world at all: influential members of this group include psychologist J. J. Gibson and roboticist Rodney Brooks, who both argued in favor of "intelligence without representation". The abstract noun “consciousness” is not often used in the contemporary literature, though it should be noted that it is originally derived from the Latin con (with) and scire (to know). Rats, for example, have no concept whatsoever of calculus. However, it still seems reasonable to believe that animals can have at least some conscious states from rudimentary pains to various perceptual states and perhaps even to some level of self-consciousness. Lovelace was essentially dismissive of the idea that a machine such as the Analytical Engine could think in a humanlike way. There is therefore an explanatory gap between the physical and mental. However, this test can be used only to detect, but not refute the existence of consciousness. McGinn, C. “Consciousness and Space.” In Metzinger 1995. [167][168][169] Finally, brain death results in an irreversible disruption of consciousness. Some conscious states seem not to be “about” anything, such as pains, anxiety, or after-images, and so would be non-representational conscious states. Kriegel has used several different names for his “neo-Brentanian theory,” such as the SOMT (Same-Order Monitoring Theory) and, more recently, the “self-representational theory of consciousness.” To be sure, the notion of a mental state representing itself or a mental state with one part representing another part is in need of further development and is perhaps somewhat mysterious. If so, the next question is whether the patient can respond in a meaningful way to questions and commands. Nagel’s argument doesn’t show that bat mental states are not identical with bat brain states. Both first-person and third-person scientific data about the brain and consciousness can be acquired and used to solve the hard problem. Can consciousness be explained in terms of brain activity? [4] Opinions differ about what exactly needs to be studied and explained as consciousness. Balog, K. “Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.” In. “Misrepresenting consciousness.”, Weisberg, J. The three main types of monism are physicalism (which holds that the mind consists of matter organized in a particular way), idealism (which holds that only thought or experience truly exists, and matter is merely an illusion), and neutral monism (which holds that both mind and matter are aspects of a distinct essence that is itself identical to neither of them). Most contemporary theories of consciousness are aimed at explaining state consciousness; that is, explaining what makes a mental state a conscious mental state. Turing disavowed any interest in terminology, saying that even "Can machines think?" Intuitively, it seems that conscious states, as opposed to unconscious ones, are mental states that I am “aware of” in some sense. Perhaps most important for the materialist, however, is recognition of the fact that different concepts can pick out the same property or object in the world (Loar 1990, 1997). Perhaps most important for mental states to be conscious, however, is that such content must be “poised” (P), which is an importantly functional notion. Moreover, in the aftermath of the Darwinian revolution, it would seem that materialism is on even stronger ground provided that one accepts basic evolutionary theory and the notion that most animals are conscious. For one thing, many philosophers would not take such purely behavioral (e.g., linguistic) evidence to support the conclusion that machines are capable of having phenomenal first person experiences. (See Identity Theory.). If so, then it would be odd indeed to hold that non-physical conscious states suddenly appear on the scene with humans. The general pattern of each argument is to assume that all the physical facts are known about some conscious mind or conscious experience. [59], The most commonly given answer is that we attribute consciousness to other people because we see that they resemble us in appearance and behavior; we reason that if they look like us and act like us, they must be like us in other ways, including having experiences of the sort that we do. This is partly because what really seems to be doing most of the work on Tye’s PANIC account is the very functional sounding “poised” notion, which is perhaps closer to Block’s access consciousness (see section 1) and is therefore not necessarily able to explain phenomenal consciousness (see Kriegel 2002). Gilbert Ryle (1949) mockingly calls the Cartesian view about the nature of mind, a belief in the “ghost in the machine.” Secondly, assuming that some such energy transfer makes any sense at all, it is also then often alleged that interactionism is inconsistent with the scientifically well-established Conservation of Energy principle, which says that the total amount of energy in the universe, or any controlled part of it, remains constant. Such patients experience a peaceful moving toward a light through a tunnel like structure, or are able to see doctors working on their bodies while hovering over them in an emergency room (sometimes akin to what is called an “out of body experience”). Churchland, P. S. “Consciousness: the Transmutation of a Concept.” In, Crick, F. and Koch, C. “Toward a Neurobiological Theory of Consciousness.” In. This idea arose from proposals in the 1980s, by Christof von der Malsburg and Wolf Singer, that gamma oscillations could solve the so-called binding problem, by linking information represented in different parts of the brain into a unified experience. Another general worry is with the very use of the term “correlate.” As any philosopher, scientist, and even undergraduate student should know, saying that “A is correlated with B” is rather weak (though it is an important first step), especially if one wishes to establish the stronger identity claim between consciousness and neural activity. It has been argued that consciousness emerged (i) exclusively with the first humans, (ii) exclusively with the first mammals, (iii) independently in mammals and birds, or (iv) with the first reptiles. [81] He argues that a deterministic machine must be regarded as conscious if it is able to produce judgments on all problematic properties of consciousness (such as qualia or binding) having no innate (preloaded) philosophical knowledge on these issues, no philosophical discussions while learning, and no informational models of other creatures in its memory (such models may implicitly or explicitly contain knowledge about these creatures' consciousness). For example, to what extent can animals recognize themselves, such as in a mirror, in order to demonstrate some level of self-awareness? [176], To most philosophers, the word "consciousness" connotes the relationship between the mind and the world. “Conceiving what is not there.” In. After all, if conscious mental states are simply identical to brain states, then there may simply be a “brute fact” that really does not need any further explaining. These and other NCCs are explored at length in Metzinger (2000). (But for more recent defenses of type-type identity theory see Hill and McLaughlin 1999, Papineau 1994, 1995, 1998, Polger 2004.) In general, it does not refer to the specifically moral conscience, but to a shared understanding of social norms. Whatever the merits and exact nature of the argument from transparency (see Kind 2003), it is clear, of course, that not all mental representations are conscious, so the key question eventually becomes: What exactly distinguishes conscious from unconscious mental states (or representations)? (5) It is interested in some parts of these objects to the exclusion of others". These and other important questions are at the center of much current theorizing about animal cognition. For example, philosophers sometimes refer to conscious states as phenomenal or qualitative states. However, it remains unspecified which kinds of information are integrated in a conscious manner and which kinds can be integrated without consciousness. In this case, the English speaker is acting as a computer and the rulebook as a program. Although dream sleep and non-dream sleep appear very similar to an outside observer, each is associated with a distinct pattern of brain activity, metabolic activity, and eye movement; each is also associated with a distinct pattern of experience and cognition. There is also philosophical interest in many other disorders, such as phantom limb pain (where one feels pain in a missing or amputated limb), various agnosias (such as visual agnosia where one is not capable of visually recognizing everyday objects), and anosognosia (which is denial of illness, such as when one claims that a paralyzed limb is still functioning, or when one denies that one is blind). The primary contemporary interest lies more in the use of the expressions “x is conscious” or “x is conscious of y.” Under the former category, perhaps most important is the distinction between state and creature consciousness (Rosenthal 1993a). Carruthers, P. “Meta-cognition in animals: A skeptical look.”, Chalmers, D.J. This is meant as analogous to past similar eliminations based on deeper scientific understanding, for example, we no longer need to speak of “ether” or “phlogiston.” Other eliminativists, more modestly, argue that there is no such thing as qualia when they are defined in certain problematic ways (Dennett 1988). To what extent must an organism or system be physiologically like us in order to be conscious? The two main types of dualism are substance dualism (which holds that the mind is formed of a distinct type of substance not governed by the laws of physics) and property dualism (which holds that the laws of physics are universally valid but cannot be used to explain the mind). To read The Glorious American Essay is to envision the American experiment itself as a kind of essay, a narrative characterized by trial and error, triumphs and false starts. Finally, it should also be noted that not all materialists believe that conscious mentality can be explained in terms of the physical, at least in the sense that the former cannot be “reduced” to the latter. Another launching point came from the discovery of the phenomenon known as “blindsight” (Weiskrantz 1986), which is very frequently discussed in the philosophical literature regarding its implications for consciousness. “There are fewer things in Reality than are dreamt of in Chalmers’ Philosophy.” In. In Gennaro 2004a. The idea is that science is showing us that conscious mental states, such as visual perceptions, are simply identical with certain neuro-chemical brain processes; much like the science of chemistry taught us that water just is H2O. The basic idea is that if a machine could fool an interrogator (who could not see the machine) into thinking that it was human, then we should say it thinks or, at least, has intelligence. For many decades, consciousness as a research topic was avoided by the majority of mainstream scientists, because of a general feeling that a phenomenon defined in subjective terms could not properly be studied using objective experimental methods. This measure was shown to be higher in individuals that are awake, in REM sleep or in a locked-in state than in those who are in deep sleep or in a vegetative state,[106] making it potentially useful as a quantitative assessment of consciousness states. An Introduction.” In, Neander, K. “The Division of Phenomenal Labor: A Problem for Representational Theories of Consciousness.” In. As was seen earlier in discussing neural theories of consciousness (section 4a), the search for the so-called “neural correlates of consciousness” (NCCs) is a major preoccupation of philosophers and scientists alike (Metzinger 2000). Thus, there are various attempts to make sense of and elaborate upon this key intuition in a way that is, as it were, “in-between” standard FO and HO theory. Carruthers, P. “HOP over FOR, HOT Theory.” In Gennaro 2004a. (For a nice review article, see Graham 2002.) Searle’s larger argument, however, is that one cannot get semantics (meaning) from syntax (formal symbol manipulation). It seems fair to say that it encounters even more serious objections than interactionism. [149] In computational neuroscience, Bayesian approaches to brain function have been used to understand both the evaluation of sensory information in light of previous experience, and the integration of information over time. [172] A similar concept appears in Buddhist philosophy, expressed by the Sanskrit term Citta-saá¹tÄna, which is usually translated as mindstream or "mental continuum". A related and increasingly popular version of representational theory holds that the meta-psychological state in question should be understood as intrinsic to (or part of) an overall complex conscious state. Gennaro (2012) argues that no conscious experience results in such cases and wonders, for example, how a sole (unconscious) HOT can result in a conscious state at all. There are still, though, a cluster of expressions and terms related to Nagel’s sense, and some authors simply stipulate the way that they use such terms. They show how our conscious experience can discriminate between a virtually unlimited number of different possible scenes and details (differentiation) because it integrates those details from our sensory systems, while the integrative nature of consciousness in this view easily explains how our experience can seem unified as one whole despite all of these individual parts. The work of Sigmund Freud was very important, at minimum, in bringing about the near universal acceptance of the existence of unconscious mental states and processes. This method fell into disrepute in the early twentieth century because of grave doubts about its reliability, but has been rehabilitated to some degree, especially when used in combination with techniques for examining brain activity. One cannot ask the machine about virtually anything, as Turing had envisioned. What is religion? One leading candidate is offered by Francis Crick and Christof Koch 1990 (see also Crick 1994, Koch 2004). Hill, C. S. “Imaginability, Conceivability, Possibility, and the Mind-Body Problem.” In, Hill, C. and McLaughlin, B. Block, N, Flanagan, O. ), Mandler, G. "Consciousness: Respectable, useful, and probably necessary". Eds. On the other hand, we also often speak of organisms or creatures as conscious, such as when we say “human beings are conscious” or “dogs are conscious.” Creature consciousness is also simply meant to refer to the fact that an organism is awake, as opposed to sleeping or in a coma. [14], The origin of the modern concept of consciousness is often attributed to Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding, published in 1690. As was seen earlier with neural theories (section 4a) and as will be seen below on the neural correlates of consciousness (5b), some attempts to solve the binding problem have to do with trying to isolate the precise brain mechanisms responsible for consciousness. “Exaggerated reports: reply to Block.”. Tye also asserts that such content is “abstract” (A) and not necessarily about particular concrete objects. [51] Notable theories falling into this category include the holonomic brain theory of Karl Pribram and David Bohm, and the Orch-OR theory formulated by Stuart Hameroff and Roger Penrose. It is this “self-representing” which makes the state conscious. There are some brain states in which consciousness seems to be absent, including dreamless sleep, coma, and death. al. Probably the two most cited FOR theories of consciousness are those of Fred Dretske (1995) and Michael Tye (1995, 2000), though there are many others as well (e.g., Harman 1990, Kirk 1994, Byrne 2001, Thau 2002, Droege 2003). If the binding problem can be solved, then we arguably have identified the elusive neural correlate of consciousness and have, therefore, perhaps even solved the hard problem. [148] Memory comes into play in at least two ways. Perhaps consciousness is simply a fundamental or irreducible part of nature in some sense (Chalmers 1996). To what extent can animals deceive or empathize with other animals, either of which would indicate awareness of the minds of others? Are cats and dogs capable of having complex higher-order thoughts such as “I am in mental state M”? More technically, philosophers often view such states as having qualitative properties called “qualia” (prounced like “kwal’ ee uh”; the singular is quale). Lurz, R. “Neither HOT nor COLD: An Alternative Account of Consciousness.” In. In this respect, a state's being conscious is a matter of its availability to interact with other states and of the access that one has to its content. More sophisticated work on the nature of consciousness and perception can be found in the work of Plato’s most famous student Aristotle (see Caston 2002), and then throughout the later Medieval period. Rosenthal, D. M. “Thinking that one thinks.” In M. Davies and G. Humphreys, eds. In essence, he says that computers or robots are just not made of the right stuff with the right kind of “causal powers” to produce genuine thought or consciousness. The earliest English language uses of "conscious" and "consciousness" date back, however, to the 1500s. This is an argument based on the phenomenological first-person observation, which goes back to Moore (1903), that when one turns one’s attention away from, say, the blue sky and onto one’s experience itself, one is still only aware of the blueness of the sky. [37] Kong Derick has also stated that there are two types of consciousness: high level consciousness, which he attributes to the mind, and low level consciousness, which he attributes to the submind. Thus, by speaking of "consciousness" we end up misleading ourselves by thinking that there is any sort of thing as consciousness separated from behavioral and linguistic understandings. The other related motivation for representational theories of consciousness is that many believe that an account of representation or intentionality can more easily be given in naturalistic terms, such as causal theories whereby mental states are understood as representing outer objects in virtue of some reliable causal connection. Instead, he sees the “explanatory gap [as] primarily an epistemological problem” (2001: 10). [179], sentience or awareness of internal or external existence, This article is about cognition. Although “supervenience” is a highly technical notion with many variations, the idea is basically one of dependence (instead of identity); for example, that the mental depends on the physical in the sense that any mental change must be accompanied by some physical change (see Kim 1993). [92], Although verbal report is in practice the "gold standard" for ascribing consciousness, it is not the only possible criterion. [121] Edelman also stresses the importance of the evolutionary emergence of higher-order consciousness in humans from the historically older trait of primary consciousness which humans share with non-human animals (see Neural correlates section above). In its earliest uses in the 1500s, the English word "conscious" retained the meaning of the Latin conscius. Moore, G. E. “The Refutation of Idealism.” In G. E. Moore, Nagel, T. “What is it like to be a Bat?” In, Natsoulas, T. “The Case for Intrinsic Theory I. Lurz, R. “Either FOR or HOR: A False Dichotomy.” In Gennaro 2004a. So how similar are they? In contrast to the raw electrical responses that do not correlate with consciousness, the modulation of these responses by other stimuli correlates surprisingly well with an important aspect of consciousness: namely with the phenomenal experience of stimulus intensity (brightness, contrast). Van Gulick, R. “Inward and Upward: Reflection, Introspection and Self-Awareness.” In. Rosenthal, D. 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